Good afternoon, and welcome to today’s hearing: “Countering the Nuclear Threat to the Homeland: Evaluating the Procurement of Radiation Detection Technologies”.

I would just like to take a moment before we begin here today to briefly discuss this subcommittee’s agenda for the 110th Congress.  This subcommittee is faced with one of the most daunting challenges that confronts our society today, securing our nation from terrorists who are constantly thinking of new and innovative ways to harm us.

I think we can all agree that we are certainly safer than we were prior to September 11, 2001, but we are still not safe.  This subcommittee’s primary focus will be on closing the most glaring gaps in our security.  To this end, we will be holding a number of very important hearings in the coming weeks and months.

With respect to biological security, this subcommittee plans to hold a hearing next month on how we can strengthen Project BioShield.  Recent events have made clear that this program continues to struggle, and this hearing will provide an opportunity to closely examine how to streamline operations of this critical program.  I intend to make this one of my top priorities as Chairman of this subcommittee.

It is also crucial that we look for ways to increase the effectiveness of both the biological and nuclear detection technology that we have deployed along many of our border crossings and points of entry.  This technology can be our last, best chance to prevent a catastrophic attack.  It is therefore crucial that we have the best technology at our disposal, and I also plan to hold hearings in the upcoming weeks on how we can best accomplish this goal.

I also intend to hold a number of hearings to explore how we can strengthen our nation’s cybersecurity efforts.  We rely heavily upon our cyber systems and we must ensure that we have the most robust tools at our disposal to keep these systems secure.

Ranking Member McCaul and I have had the opportunity to discuss many of these issues, and I think we are both in agreement about the glaring threats our nation faces.  I look forward to working with him, and with other Members of this subcommittee, to close the gaps and make our nation safer.

Turning back to today’s hearing, I want to welcome and thank our witnesses.  Vayl Oxford is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and he and I have worked very closely on many of the issues that I previously mentioned.  I would also like to thank our second witness, Gene Aloise of the Government Accountability Office, for coming today and for his work on this important topic.   

I must compliment Dr. Oxford and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office for moving so aggressively to procure and deploy technologies to detect radiological and special nuclear materials at the nation’s ports of entry. 

You have accomplished a lot. As of February 2007, Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) were scanning 100% of all U.S. mail, 89% of all cargo entering through U.S. seaports, 96% of cargo at the Southern border and 91% at the Northern border, with expected increases to 97% at seaports and 99% at the Southern border by the end of FY07. 

To date, roughly 1,000 RPMs have been deployed.  Future deployments designed to scan 100% of all conveyances will require an additional 1,500 – 2,000 units over a deployment schedule through FY13.  While the subcommittee is impressed with DNDO’s efforts, we are concerned that such an aggressive schedule might have resulted in short cuts in the decision-making process to acquire ASP technology.

This is the fundamental question that the subcommittee is examining today.  The GAO’s October 2006 report and the testimony submitted by Mr. Aloise certainly point to this possibility.

I would like to say that I understand that both of our witnesses are doing their duty to protect this country, and I applaud the hard work and dedication of you both.  It is my hope that through an open and thorough discussion we will come to some agreement on how best to move forward.

For example, the cost benefit analysis assumed a 95% positive identification rate for highly enriched uranium (HEU).  The 2005 tests of the equipment showed that currently the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) did not perform nearly this well.

We need to figure out why, whether expecting this kind of performance is realistic, and if not, how to move forward from here.  I look forward to your testimony and to a fruitful discussion of this important issue.