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IB89140: Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
February 10, 2000
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974. Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population, live in the southern two
thirds of the island. Turkish Cypriots live in the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (recognized only by Turkey), with about 30,000 Turkish troops providing
security. U.N. peacekeeping forces maintain a
buffer zone between the two. Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negotiations aimed
at creating a federal, bicommunal, bizonal
republic on Cyprus. The two sides would pledge not to move toward union with any other country. This reflects
concerns that Greek Cypriots would like to unite
with Greece and that Turkish Cypriots seek to partition the island, linking the north to Turkey.
The Secretary General's April 5, 1992 "set of ideas" is a framework for negotiations for an overall settlement.
The Security Council implied Turkish Cypriot leader
Rauf Denktash's responsibility for their failure and called for confidence-building measures (CBMs). Glafcos Clerides
was elected president of the Republic of
Cyprus in February 1993. Subsequent talks focused on CBMs to place part of the uninhabited town of Varosha
(Maras) under U.N. administration and reopen
Nicosia (Lefkosa) airport, among other measures. Denktash failed to return to talks on June 14, 1993. Both sides
eventually accepted CBMs in principle, but did
not agree on Secretary General's proposed method for recording clarifications.
A January 4, 1997 confirmation that Greek Cypriots would acquire Russian S-300 missiles prompted the United
States to deplore the purchase and Turkey to
threaten military action to prevent deployment and to bond closer to Turkish Cyprus. The missiles were the focus
of intense crisis prevention efforts. On
December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus and they have since been deployed on
the Greek island of Crete.
The prospect of Cyprus's European Union accession triggered heightened international attention to Cyprus and
complicated settlement efforts. The U.N. hosted
inconclusive talks between Clerides and Denktash in July and August 1997. Denktash demands that the TRNC be
recognized as a state like the Greek-Cypriot side.
He concluded a declaration of partial integration with Turkey to parallel Cyprus's integration with the EU.
In June 1999, the G-8 group of industrialized countries and Russia suggested that the Secretary General invite
the parties to negotiations in fall 1999. Clerides
and Denktash participated in a first round of U.N. moderated proximity (indirect) talks in New York, beginning
December 3-14, and a second round in Geneva,
January 31-February 8, 2000. No details were disclosed. A third round will be held in May, after a presidential
election in northern Cyprus.
Members of Congress have urged the Administration to be more active, although they have not proposed an
alternative to the U.N.-sponsored talks. Some
Members seek increased pressure on Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The United Nations held a second round of proximity (indirect) talks with (Greek) Cypriot President
Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash
in Geneva, January 31-February 8. Denktash has refused to meet Clerides directly until the Turkish Cypriot state
is acknowledged to have equal status with that
of the Greek Cypriots, whereas Clerides insists on the bizonal federation framework of past U.N. resolutions. The
U.N. again imposed a news blackout. Another
round of indirect talks has been set for May 23 in New York, and U.N. diplomats have said that more talks will be
needed before a settlement is reached.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The small island of Cyprus, which gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960, has been divided since
1974. The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic
origin, and 19% of Turkish ethnic origin. (Under 5% of the population are Maronites, Armenians, Roman Catholic
Latins, and others.) At independence, the
republic's constitution defined elaborate power-sharing arrangements. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a
Turkish Cypriot vice president, each elected by
his own community. The Treaty of Alliance among the Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and
650 Turkish soldiers to help defend the island.
The United States praised the new republic for its "effort to create a new state based on the cooperation of different
ethnic communities," although the two sides
aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots favored union with Greece (enosis), and
Turkish Cypriots preferred partition of the island (taksim) and
uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus' success as a new republic lasted from 1960-63. After President Makarios proposed constitutional
modifications in favor of the majority community in
1963, relations between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating into
enclaves in larger towns. In 1964, Turkish
Cypriots withdrew from most national institutions and began to administer their own affairs. Intercommunal violence
occurred in 1963-64, and again in 1967. On
both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from
intervening militarily on behalf of the Turkish
Cypriot community. Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have been a buffer between the two
communities.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios, replacing him with a hard-line
supporter of enosis. Turkey, citing the 1960
Treaty of Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August 25, was in
control of over 36% of the island. The military
intervention (often called an invasion) had a number of byproducts. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the
Cypriot population and a host of related
refugee and property problems. The Athens junta fell, civilian government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia,
Greece withdrew from NATO's military
command to protest NATO's failure to prevent Turkey's action, and Turkey's civilian government entered an
extended period of instability. U.S. relations with all
parties suffered.
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities separate in two sovereign
states or two states in a loose confederation. In
February 1975, they declared their government the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (TFSC). In 1983, Turkish
Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) -- a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of
independence. Turkish Cypriots have a constitution and
a 50-seat parliament. Denktash argued that creation of an independent state was a necessary precondition for a
federation with the Greek Cypriots. He ruled out
merger with Turkey, and pledged cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides' interests and reestablishing a central
government. They foundered on definitions of goals and
ways to implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political equality of the two
communities. Greek Cypriots emphasized the
three freedoms -- movement, property, and settlement. Greek Cypriots envision a society with free movement of
people; Turkish Cypriots prefer two nearly
autonomous societies with limited contact. They also differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek
Cypriots want their internationally recognized
national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then join a Cypriot republic. For the
Turkish Cypriots, two entities would join, for the
first time, in a new federation. These views could affect resolution of property, citizenship of Turkish settlers, and
other legal issues. Since 1974, there have been
several formal sets of U.N.- sponsored negotiations as well as indirect talks:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting. Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an
independent, nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each
administration's control over territory will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property
rights; 3)freedom of movement, settlement, and
property will be discussed; and 4) powers and functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity
of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique. Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues,
giving priority to Varosha; to abstain from actions which might jeopardize the talks, accept the principle of
demilitarization, and eschew union in whole or part with
any other country.
1984 Proximity Talks. After the 1983 declaration of the "TRNC," both sides
proposed confidence-building measures and resolution through
a comprehensive framework. Proximity or indirect talks were conducted through U.N. representatives on
constitutional arrangements, withdrawal of foreign
troops, and the status of international treaties and guarantees dating from 1959-60.
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise. In January 1985, Denktash and
Kyprianou met in New York. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a
draft U.N. document; Greek Cypriots considered it a basis for negotiations, but did not want to sign. The U.N.
modified the document in light of objections.
Greek Cypriots accepted an April 1985 version; Turkish Cypriots did not. Greek Cypriots opposed a March 1986
revision and called for an international
conference or a new summit to revitalize the process.
1988-89 Talks. In August 1988, Cypriot President Vassiliou and Denktash
reaffirmed commitments to the 1977 and 1979 agreements and
expressed willingness to work to achieve, by June 1, 1989, an outline for a settlement. After futile informal direct
talks, they submitted papers which hardened
positions. In April 1989, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar discouraged the parties from writing positions and
proposed separate meetings to draft an agreement
outline on a noncommittal basis. Denktash criticized the new approach as substituting proximity talks for direct talks,
but the U.N. believed the parties had agreed
to "separate and periodic joint meetings." In June, Perez de Cuellar circulated draft ideas for an outline of an
agreement. Turkish Cypriots opposed the U.N.
"ideas," arguing that the U.N. had gone beyond its good offices role to become a mediator, and stated that only a
document drafted by the parties would be
acceptable.
March 1990 - April 1992. Security Council Res. 649, May 13, 1990, reaffirmed
the Secretary General's right to make suggestions. It
referred to the federal solution as bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial
aspects -- the first U.N. reference to bizonality, a
key concept for the Turkish Cypriots. In June 1991, Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting. On August
2, President Bush announced that Greece and
Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus. The Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range
of agreement first. The Greek and Turkish Prime
Ministers were unable to find common ground. On October 8, the Secretary General reported that a conference was
not possible and blamed Denktash's assertion
that each side possessed sovereignty, differing from U.N. resolutions attributing that characteristic solely to the
Republic. Security Council Res. 716, Oct. 11,
1991, called on the parties not to introduce concepts varying from established principles.
"Set of Ideas." Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's April 1992
report suggested a bizonal federation of two politically equal communities,
possessing one international personality and sovereignty. A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower
house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house. 7:3 ratio would prevail in the federal executive. Each state would be
guaranteed a majority of the population and of
land in its area. Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty of Alliance would withdraw. In June,
Boutros-Ghali presented a "non-map." Talks led to a
new U.N. draft, providing for a separate referendum by each community within 30 days of an agreement, an
18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish
troops, guarantees consistent with Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek
Cypriot embargo, free movement, a timetable
for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their property, 3 constitutions (one for each community and one for the
central government), a 7:3 ratio in the
executive, vice presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an island-wide referendum on EC membership, and
the return of Varosha and about 30 villages to
Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation. Greek Cypriots would get Morphou,
a citrus-producing region that is home to
about 11,000 Turkish Cypriots. Denktash said that they and Turkish Cypriots to be displaced from other areas total
40,000 or about one-quarter of the Turkish
Cypriot population. Vassiliou estimated that 82,000 Greek Cypriots would be able to return home and that
Denktash's 40,000 figure was inflated.
On August 21, Boutros-Ghali reported that his map provided for 2 federated states, the return of many Greek
Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot retention of the
coastline and traditional villages. He said that Denktash's territorial proposals were not close to the "non-map," and
observed that Morphou's economic
significance had declined and that arrangements would be made for displaced Turkish Cypriots. Vassiliou was
depicted as ready to negotiate an agreement based
on the map. Denktash accepted the right of return and right to property, provided practical difficulties were taken
into account. Boutros-Ghali concluded that an
agreement was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw territorial adjustment in line with his map. Denktash said the
report was unacceptable. Security Council Res.
774, August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map. The Secretary General's November 19 report implied
Denktash's responsibility for the lack of
progress. The parties agreed to face-to-face talks in March 1993, but a February 14 election in Cyprus produced
a new president, Glafcos Clerides, and a delay.
Clerides accepted the set of ideas only "in principle," objecting to provisions that he believed might enable the
Turkish Cypriots to block EC membership, on Greek
Cypriot refugees' right to return and property, and on the Republic's status during the transition period.
Confidence-building Measures. On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a
reduction of Turkish troops in exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control
of Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.
supervised island-wide census; cooperation in
U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha for contacts and commerce
and reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under
U.N. control but unused since 1974. Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash wanted
to retain about 20% and/or have a U.N. security
circle around it and an end to the Greek Cypriot embargo of northern Cyprus. Greek Cypriots sought to avoid
recognizing the TRNC. Denktash claimed that
CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots, and would not return to New York. U.N.
representatives concluded that Turkish Cypriots were
ill-informed on CBMs and Turkey's support for them had been communicated to the U.N., but not to the Turkish
Cypriots. Boutros-Ghali concluded that the
Turkish Cypriots had undertaken a campaign of disinformation. U.N. experts determined that both sides would
benefit from the CBMs, with relatively greater
benefits for Turkish Cypriots because of their smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them.
In his November 22, 1993 Report, endorsed by Security Council Res. 889, December 15, 1993, Boutros-Ghali
urged Turkey to reduce its forces to their 1982 level
in exchange for a suspension of Greek Cypriot weapons acquisitions. Clerides reiterated a call to demilitarize the
island, and offered to suspend his arms program if
an enlarged UNFICYP replaced Turkish forces, and if the (Greek Cypriot) National Guard and comparable Turkish
Cypriot forces were disbanded and disarmed.
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle. He later contended that a March 21 U.N. draft
unbalanced equities in the CBMs, was concerned
about U.N. jurisdiction over a road outside of Varosha, and believed that timing of benefits was no longer equal.
Clerides said that he would accept the March 21
text if Denktash would. The Secretary General's May 30 report, made known on June 1, insisted that the March draft
had not destroyed balance. Boutros-Ghali
wrote that lack of agreement was "due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side." On May
31, Denktash had said that he would accept the
CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated. Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document.
Boutros-Ghali's June 28 letter to the Security
Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement CBMs based on the March paper and
clarifications, and said that he intended to
address an identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and to submit the March 21 paper and
the letters for the Security Council to endorse.
Neither side accepted this procedure.
Developments, 1996-1999
Violent incidents in the buffer zone between June and October 1996 prompted the U.N. to propose indirect
military talks on specific measures to prevent more
violence. Talks under UNFICYP auspices began in October 1996 and were held for several years.
On January 4, 1997, Cyprus signed a contract to purchase Russian S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft
missiles with a 90-mile range, i.e. able to reach southern Turkey, at
a cost of about $400 million. The missiles were to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by
Greece. The U.S. State Department said that the
decision "introduces a new and destabilizing element" which "threatens to take the arms buildup on Cyprus to a new
and disturbing qualitative level ...." Turkish
officials said that they would not allow the weapons to be deployed. The State Department declared that any threat
to use force was unacceptable. A U.S. envoy
said that the Greek Cypriots had assured him the missiles would not be delivered for 16 months and that the United
States will work to "make sure the missile
situation is gone" in that time. On January 20, Turkish President Demirel and Denktash signed a joint defense
declaration, stating that reassurance that the missiles
will not be deployed for some time is "meaningless" and that any attack on the TRNC would be considered an attack
on Turkey.
In 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for indirect talks followed by open-ended, face-to-face talks
between Clerides and Denktash. His Special
Representative on Cyprus began proximity or indirect talks, focusing on goodwill gestures to create a climate
beneficial to direct talks and on issues in the "Set of
Ideas." (See Past Settlement Efforts, above.) Goodwill gestures were made. Turkish Cypriot
Muslims and Greek Cypriot Orthodox exchanged visits to holy
sites, held bicommunal events, and business and professional meetings. Greek Air Force planes did not overfly
Cyprus during joint Greek-Greek Cypriot military
exercises in May 1997 and for the next 5 months. Turkish planes did not overfly Cyprus as long as Greek aircraft
did not do so.
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and again from August
11-15 in Switzerland. Before talks began, Denktash
said that he would not sign any documents until the European Union suspended its membership accession process
with the (Greek) Cypriot government as the sole
representative of Cyprus. (See European Union Membership, below.) Denktash said that a
settlement was not possible without political equality and
sovereignty, the accession process stopped, and the delivery of missiles withdrawn. He refused to sign a joint
declaration at the end of the talks. A statement by
the U.N. Security Council President said that progress had been impeded by the Turkish Cypriots' preconditions.
Greece terminated its moratorium on military flights over Cyprus before joint exercises with Cypriot forces on
October 10, 1997. Turkey ended its parallel
moratorium on October 14. During the exercises, Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus,
but neither side fired. Greece charged that
Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister's plane. In October, Turkey conducted exercises in northern
Cyprus, including the mock destruction of missile
launchers.
After the December 12, 1997 EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus, Denktash informed the
U.N. that "intercommunal talks have ended," and
that he would only participate in talks between states having equal status. On December 27, the TRNC suspended
all bicommunal activities except religious
pilgrimages.
The Turkish Cypriots accepted the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tensions along the cease-fire line,
including defining the distance between guards
along the border, unloaded weapons, and rules of behavior. The Greek Cypriots objected to a proposal for each side
to unman certain sentry posts because, they
said, to do so might leave residential areas vulnerable.
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on January 24, 1998. The
S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base.
The Cypriot government gradually developed the position that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or
substantial progress toward a settlement, then it
would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Demirel issued a communique calling for negotiations only between sovereign, equal
states. They said that it was essential for the
TRNC to continue to exist as an independent and sovereign state and that the special relationship between Turkey
and the TRNC would be enhanced in every field.
On June 16, Greece sent four F-16 fighter planes and one C-130 cargo plane to the Paphos air base. Turkey
responded on June 18 by sending six F-16's to
northern Cyprus. Prime Minister Yilmaz recommended that Greece stop testing Turkey's resolve.
Cypriot troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July with a test-firing. The Cypriot press claimed that
Secretary of State Albright had asked President
Clerides to reconsider the S-300 purchase, to store the missiles outside of Cyprus, or to replace the order with one
for shorter range SA-15s. Clerides proposed
options for postponement or cancellation of deployment. Turkish officials would not bargain over the S-300s.
On August 31, Denktash proposed the creation of a Cyprus Confederation based on (1) a special relationship
between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), (2) a special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot government, (3)
establishment of a Confederation between the TRNC
and the Greek Cypriot government, (4) the 1960 Treaty of Guarantees, (5) the Confederation may, if the parties
agree, pursue accession to the EU. The Greek
Cypriot government declared the proposal to be "unacceptable." The U.S. Administration, the U.N., and others
reiterated that the basis for a settlement is a bizonal,
bicommunal federation on Cyprus.
On December 29, Clerides announced his decision not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus and to negotiate with
Russia for their deployment on the Greek island of
Crete. The EU, United States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided a face-saving context for Clerides' decision. A
December 14 letter from Secretary General
Annan to the President of the Security Council reported that his Special Representative, Dame Ann Hercus, was
continuing shuttle talks, focusing on reduction of
tensions, core issues, and humanitarian/ goodwill issues. He perceived a "flexible approach by both sides." On
December 22, the Security Council approved
S/Res/1217, to renew the UNFICYP mandate, and S/Res/1218, requesting the Secretary General to work with the
two sides on (a) an undertaking to refrain from
the threat or use of force to resolve the Cyprus problem, (b) a staged process of limiting and then substantially
reducing troops and arms on Cyprus, (c)
implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures aimed at reducing tension along the cease-fire lines, (d)
progress in tension reduction, (e) efforts to achieve
substantive progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive settlement, and (f) other measures that will build trust
and cooperation. On December 22, President
Clinton vowed "to take all necessary steps to support the Security Council resolutions" and Prime Minister Blair said
that "Britain is committed to working for full
implementation" of 1218. Turkey viewed the Cypriot decision as a victory. On February 9, 1999, Grace and Cyprus
signed an agreement whereby Russian S-300
missiles previously destined for Cyprus will be deployed on Crete under Greek control.
On January 17, 1999, it was reported that the head of the Greek Cypriot National Guard had rejected an
UNFICYP disengagement proposal, saying that there is no
room for disengagement in Nicosia's inhabited areas. He also did not want disengagement to proceed in pieces,
preferring a framework of military measures to
achieve complete demilitarization.
On June 20, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and Russia urged the Secretary General
to invite the leaders of the two parties to
comprehensive, continuous negotiations, without preconditions, in the fall of 1999. In his June 22 report to the
Security Council, the Secretary General declared
his readiness to invite the leaders to negotiations as suggested by the G-8. On June 29, the Security Council passed
S/Res/1250, expressing appreciation to the
G-8 and calling upon the two leaders to support a comprehensive negotiation and commit themselves to the
principles of no preconditions, all issues on the table, to
negotiate in good faith until a settlement is reached, and full consideration of all U.N. resolutions and treaties; and
S/Res/1251 which renewed the UNFICYP
mandate and reiterated that the goal is a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises two politically equal
communities in a bicommunal, bizonal
federation. After the G-8 statement, Denktash declared repeatedly that only his confederation proposal is on the
table. He would be willing to meet with the
Secretary General, but would not negotiate with Clerides unless northern Cyprus is accepted as an equal state. (The
German/ European Union Cyprus envoy
suggested that Denktash had left the door open for proximity talks.) Turkey supports Denktash.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot annual joint military exercise from October 2-7, no Greek planes landed at the
Paphos air base and there also were no incidents
involving Greek and Turkish planes, and Turkey's objections to the exercise were mild, unlike in previous years.
On October 13, the Secretary General named Chilean diplomat James Holger to be his acting special
representative on Cyprus. On November 1, Peruvian diplomat
Alvaro de Soto, the assistant secretary general for political affairs, became the Secretary General's Special Advisor
on Cyprus, replacing Dame Ann Hercus, who
had resigned unexpectedly in July.
There were several major developments in December 1999. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and his Special
Advisor on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto conducted
proximity or separate, indirect talks with (Greek) Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash in New York from December 3 to
14. De Soto indicated that the talks had focused on "authorities' structures and security issues." The U.N. imposed
a moratorium on public comments by the two
leaders. Unconfirmed press reports suggested that each side had discussed issues of greatest importance to it.
Clerides was said to have addressed territory,
refugees, property, and a multinational force, while Denktash was reported to have raised his idea for a confederation
and an end to the embargo on northern
Cyprus.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1283 (December 15, 1999), based on the Secretary General's November 29
Report, extended the mandate of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) thru June 15, 2000. The Council reaffirmed "all its relevant resolutions
on Cyprus," without specifically reiterating that
a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty on the island is its goal. On December 15, the Secretary
General submitted an addendum to his
November 29 Report, noting that the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Britain concurred with UNFICYP's
extension. He also stated, "The Government of
Turkey has indicated that it concurs with ... the position the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can
operate on both sides of the island only on the basis
of the consent of both parties and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work
with them to develop modalities of UNFICYP's
operation in northern Cyprus." The Turkish Cypriots interpreted this statement as a move toward recognition of
their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset
with this Turkish Cypriot view.
Positions of the Parties on Key
Issues (Greek Cypriot positions are on
the left; Turkish Cypriot positions are on the right.)
Sovereignty and Powers
| Greek Cypriots say that bi-communal, bizonal federation of two cantons with
one sovereignty should be established by both communities. A canton will have
maximum autonomy in internal administration, while the federation should have
power to function in key matters. |
The Turkish Cypriots say that each community should form a sovereign state
and join in a confederation as equals. |
Presidency
| The President will be elected from the Greek Cypriot community and the vice
president from the Turkish Cypriot community. To be elected, each may be
required to obtain a certain percentage of votes from the other community. |
A rotating presidency will prevent one community retaining control of the office.
Each community separately must elect its own representative to fill the office of
president or vice president. |
Territory
| The Greek Cypriots accepted the map in the U.N. set of ideas, subject to
marginal changes. Turkish Cypriot territory on the island must fall under 29+%
to allow the maximum number of refugees to remain under Greek Cypriot
administration. |
The Turkish Cypriots rejected the map included in the U.N. set of ideas.
Previously proposing a state comprising 29+% of the territory of the island,
Denktash refers only to the 32% of territory Turkish Cypriots administer. |
Security/Turkish Troops/Guarantees
| Clerides rejects Turkish guarantee, right of unilateral intervention, and military
presence. Proposes an international force of guarantors, including Greece and
Turkey, with a U.N. Security Council mandate, stationed on a demilitarized
Cyprus. |
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whereby Turkey rightfully protects the Turkish
Cypriot community, is in force and must not be diluted. Turkish troop presence
may be cut or reduced if Turkey retains its Treaty rights in a peace accord. |
Displaced Persons and Property Rights
| A majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees must return to their homes under local
Greek Cypriot administration; remaining refugees must have the right to return.
Turkish Cypriots cannot be compensated for property they did not own in 1974.
Turkish Cypriots may opt to return to properties they owned in the south in 1974
or to be compensated for them at 1974 value plus inflation. All Turkish Cypriots
to be resettled will be compensated. Turkish Cypriot misappropriation of Greek
Cypriot properties is null and void. |
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled should be compensated at the current value for
the property they occupy at the time of resettlement. Greek Cypriots unable to
return to property they owned in 1974 will be compensated from the sale of
Turkish Cypriot property in the south. The Turkish Cypriot property in the
south roughly equals the Greek Cypriot property in the north. Deeds to Greek
Cypriot properties in the north allocated to Turkish Cypriots in the north since
1974 are legally valid. A Joint Property Claims Commission composed of an
equal number of Greek- and Turkish Cypriots should be formed to moderate a
"global exchange" of titles. |
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
The Cyprus talks are vulnerable to changes in the atmosphere between the two communities and within each
community and to factors not part of the talks.
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Clerides was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus in February 1993.
During the campaign, he had asserted that a
settlement would result only if the set of ideas were changed. In a run-off, the hardline Democratic Party
(DIKO)supported Clerides, but Clerides later expressed
discontent with DIKO's position on CBMs. DIKO supported Clerides' main challenger, George Iakovou, in the
February 1997 presidential election. Clerides was
re-elected. Clerides then formed a government with the United Democratic Union (socialists/EDEK). EDEK left
the government in December 1998 because it
viewed Clerides' decision not to deploy the S-300 missiles as a blow to the joint defense doctrine, Hellenism, and
Cypriot sovereignty. Clerides thereby lost
support of a majority in parliament and has since attempted to govern by consensus.
Denktash, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, was elected the first president of the TRNC in 1983, and
reelected subsequently, most recently in April 1995.
His feud with Prime Minister Eroglu of the National Unity Party (UBP) forced early elections in 1993. Renegade
UBP deputies founded the Democratic Party
(DP) with Denktash's backing. A December 12, 1993, election produced a coalition government of the DP and the
Republican Turkish Party (CTP). Denktash's
son, Serdar, was elected DP party leader in May 1996. The government resigned in July 1996 and, in August, UBP
and DP formed a government with Eroglu as
Prime Minister and Serdar as Deputy. In December 6, 1998, elections for the 50-seat parliament, UBP won 24 seats;
DP 13; Communal Liberation Party (TKP) 7;
and CTP, 6. Eroglu was named Prime Minister and formed a coalition with the TKP, headed by Mustafa Akinci,
who became Deputy. Eroglu advocates a
constitutional amendment to limit the President to two terms. Denktash supports an amendment, but says it should
not prevent him from seeking re-election in
April 2000 and declared his candidacy. UBP declared Eroglu its candidate for president. Akinci and CTP leader
Talat also are running.
Policies of Greece and Turkey
The "motherlands," Greece and Turkey, have widely different approaches to the Cyprus problem. They defend
and protect their ethnic kin, and their bilateral
relations, strained over Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.
When Greece and Turkey developed a brief rapprochement in 1988, Greece accepted that Cyprus was not strictly
a bilateral Greek-Turkish issue and need not be
on the agenda of Greek-Turkish talks. After adverse public reaction in Greece, however, Cyprus resurfaced as a
contentious bilateral issue. On January 31, 1992,
Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met Turkish Premier Demirel and agreed to work on a treaty of friendship and
cooperation. Mitsotakis was criticized in Greece
and Cyprus for failing to declare a Cyprus settlement a precondition for improved Greek-Turkish ties. Andreas
Papandreou ousted Mitsotakis from office in the
October 1993 national election. On November 16, Papandreou and Clerides agreed to a joint defense doctrine
wherein their governments would decide on the
Cyprus issue jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its defense plan, and any Turkish advance would lead to war
between Greece and Turkey. Clerides
announced in April 1994 that Greece would provide air cover for Cyprus, while Cypriot bases would be prepared
to refuel Greek Air Force planes, a naval base
would be set up, and elite troops would bolster land forces. In January 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded Papandreou
and won a national election that September.
He retained the joint defense doctrine as official policy.
Turkish governments argue that the Cyprus problem is not acute because Turkish Cypriot security has been
ensured since 1974, and that dialogue is the appropriate
channel for resolution. Turks generally support their military forces on the island and agree that they should not
withdraw until Turkish Cypriots' rights are
guaranteed effectively. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who also had held the office in 1974, argues that the Cyprus
problem was solved in 1974. In an October 24,
1999 interview, he said, "diplomatic recognition (of the TRNC) may not be given, but it should be acknowledged
that there are two autonomous entities on the
island."
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on five "lesser" issues, excluding Cyprus and the Aegean.
Steps toward a rapprochement were accelerated after
devastating earthquakes in Turkey in August and Greece in September, which provoked mutual sympathy and good
will. Greece's decision not to veto Turkey's
candidacy for European Union membership in December confirmed that a major change relations might be underway.
Foreign Minister meetings at international
venues have become almost routine and, in January 2000, George Papandreou made the first official visit by a Greek
Foreign Minister to Turkey in 37 years. His
Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, visited Greece in early February. Most observers believe that this improved
bilateral climate could positively influence efforts to
reach a Cyprus settlement.
European Union Membership
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into force in 1988. On July 4,
1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership, stating
that it would welcome Turkish Cypriot participation in technical negotiations. Turkish Cypriots objected because
EC acceptance of the application recognized only
the Republic's government and not their own. Greece's EC membership and Turkey's lack thereof led Turks and
Turkish Cypriots to view increased EC
involvement in Cyprus as favoring Greek Cypriots.
The EU was to fix a date for Cyprus membership accession negotiations in January 1995. The EU preferred a
prior intercommunal solution, but was willing to
begin negotiations without one. In December 1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs union and some
European governments demanded that the veto be
lifted before Cyprus's application was raised. On March 6, 1995, the EU separately ratified that customs union
accord and scheduled accession talks with Cyprus.
At Greece's insistence, the Republic government is the EU's only interlocutor. Turkey said that if Greek Cypriots
were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus
government, then Turkey would integrate with the "TRNC" to the same degree. Denktash asserted that if Cyprus
becomes an EU member while Turkey is not a
member, then it would weaken Turkey's guarantees and mean a surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.
On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with Cyprus would open in
1998. On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister
Ecevit and Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of partial
integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel
that of Cyprus and the EU. On August 7, Ecevit said that, given the military buildup in southern Cyprus, the TRNC
had become essential to Turkey's security.
Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they "legitimize" an accession process initiated "illegally" by the Greek
Cypriots.
Clerides said that Turkish Cypriots could participate as full members of the negotiating team for accession if they
accept the idea of EU membership and if their
participation did not suggest recognition of the TRNC. On September 25, 1997, then Greek Deputy Foreign Minister
Papandreou said that Greece would block the
EU's expansion eastward if Cyprus were not accepted because it is divided. On March 12, 1998, French President
Chirac noted, "Cyprus has a vocation to join
Europe. But Europe does not have a vocation to take in a piece of Cyprus and ... problems which are not its own."
France withdrew its objection to accession
talks with a divided Cyprus when Greece withdrew its objection to talks with East European candidates. On June
12, at an EU summit, France reiterated its
opposition. On November 9, the French, German, Dutch, and Italian foreign ministers warned of "particular
difficulties" linked to accession talks with a divided
island. Greece again warned that it would block EU expansion if Cyprus were excluded on these grounds. On
November 10, the EU began substantive accession
negotiations with Cyprus.
On May 14, 1999, Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared,"It is clear that Cyprus can become
a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not
solved.... it is a view which I think is gradually gaining ground among the rest of our (EU) partners." On July 10,
he said that Greece would not object to Turkey's
EU membership candidacy if assured that Cyprus's accession would go ahead without a resolution. Turkey rejects
linkage between the Cyprus issue and its
candidacy. After the devastating August 17 earthquake in Turkey, Greece said that it would not veto Turkey's
candidacy if Turkey met conditions relating to
acceptance of borders in the Aegean and Cyprus' EU accession. On October 13, the European Commission
recommended that the EU designate Turkey a
candidate for membership. Greece declared again that Cyprus' uninterrupted accession, even without a settlement,
is the sine qua non for its approval of EU
enlargement.
The EU summit's conclusions on December 10, 1999, "underline(d) that a political settlement will facilitate the
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no
settlement has been achieved by the completion of accession negotiations, the ... decision on accession will be made
without the above (i.e. a settlement) being a
precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors." Greece had insisted that Cyprus be
allowed to join the EU without preconditions and
expressed satisfaction with this conclusion. Turkey focused on a reference to the fact that "all relevant factors"
would be taken into consideration when a final
decision on Cyprus's membership is made; therefore the EU could consider a settlement or lack thereof at that time
as a factor in its decision-making. Greeks argue
that the phrase refers to the EU criteria. The summit also granted Turkey EU candidacy. Even after the summit
decision, however, Turkish officials continued to
argue that accession is a core issues for the U.N. proximity talks and that it can happen only after a settlement.
Clerides says that the EU is not an issue that
concerns the U.N. efforts for a Cyprus solution.
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP (U.N. Forces in Cyprus) is now
1,219, with ten countries participating. Previous
participating countries and others suggested that UNFICYP allows the two sides to live with little fear of
intercommunal violence and lowers incentives to settle.
In 1992, Boutros-Ghali questioned whether a Force that has maintained conditions for negotiating a settlement for
28 years can still have a priority claim on scarce
resources if negotiations have not succeeded. On September 21, he reported that UNFICYP would be reduced in
various ways by December 15, 1992. Cyprus
expressed concern about a "security gap," and Cyprus and Greece increased their financial contributions.
On April 2, 1993, the Secretary General urged the Security Council to change financing to assessments instead
having costs borne by UNFICYP participating
countries, contributions, and assessments. On May 27, the Council agreed that costs not covered by contributions
would be treated as U.N. expenses. UNFICYP
costs about $45.6 million for the period form July 1999 through June 2000. The government of Cyprus contributes
one-third of the cost and the government of
Greece contributes $6.5 million annually; the rest comes out of assessments.
U.S. Policy
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement. The Carter
Administration made one initiative to supplement U.N. efforts
with a plan roughly following 1977 guidelines for a bizonal federal solution. Since the Greek Cypriots rejected that
plan as partition, no U.S. plan has been
proposed.
The 1974-78 period was marked by sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter Administrations and Congress
over Turkey's role on Cyprus. A congressionally
mandated arms embargo was in place against Turkey until September 1978. In general, Congress favors measures
to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and to
encourage concessions by Denktash, while successive administrations have argued that pressures are
counterproductive and preferred diplomacy. Although
Members of Congress do not propose an alternative to the U.N. talks, they advocate an active U.S. role. In
response, President Reagan created the State
Department post of Special Cyprus Coordinator and President Clinton named a Presidential envoy for Cyprus.
Congress had appropriated token aid for Cyprus until 1975-76, when it provided $25 million. In 1977, aid fell
to $17.5 million. Since 1978 it has been $14 million
or $15 million -- $15 million for FY2000. The funds are used for scholarships, bicommunal projects and measures
aimed at reunification of the island and
designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.
On June 1, 1995, as required by a P.L. 103-206, the State Department reported on the situation in Cyprus,
summarizing diplomatic activity since August 1994.
Some Members were displeased that the Report failed to draw conclusions, and expressed frustration that the
Administration was concerned with process more
than progress. On September 18, 1995, the House agreed to H.Con.Res. 42 (Engel), stating, in part, that it
considered that ultimate, total
demilitarization would meet the security concerns of all parties, etc. The State Department considers
demilitarization a worthy objective that cannot proceed in
isolation, but must be accompanied by progress on power-sharing and security.
On June 4, 1997, President Clinton named Richard Holbrooke as Special Presidential envoy for Cyprus. He was
assisted by Thomas Miller, State Department
Coordinator. Holbrooke was confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. in August 1999. Miller became
Ambassador to Bosnia. On August 4, career diplomat
Thomas Weston was named to be State Department Coordinator for Cyprus. On September 3, the President named
Washington lawyer Alfred Moses, former U.S.
Ambassador to Romania and former president of the American Jewish Committee, as his Special Envoy, replacing
Holbrooke.
In May 1998, Turkey's U.S. arms on Cyprus became an issue. Greek, Greek Cypriot officials,
and their American supporters, including some Members of
Congress, contended that Turkey had "illegally" transferred U.S. arms to Cyprus. The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, Sec. 620C(e)(1), added by P.L. 100-202,
December 22, 1987, requires that any agreement for the sale or provision of any article on the U.S. Munitions List
expressly state that the article is being provided
only with the understanding that it will not be transferred to Cyprus or otherwise used to further the severance or
division of Cyprus. The language of the law
applies to all purchasers or recipients of U.S. arms, not only Turkey. The U.S. Administration inventoried U.S.
arms on Cyprus, i.e., those possessed by Turkish
forces, Greek forces, and the Greek-Cypriot National Guard. On June 25, 1999, the State Department submitted
a classified report to Congress. The
Department's spokesman later said that investigators had found that "both Greece and Turkey sent U.S.-origin
military items to Cyprus in contravention of the
commitments they made to the United States...." and that the United States had asked both governments to withdraw
certain U.S.-origin equipment from Cyprus
and both agreed to do so.
Missing Persons on Cyprus
Five Americans and 1,614 Greek Cypriots were claimed missing on Cyprus since 1974. A U.N. Committee on
Missing Persons in Cyprus, comprised of a U.N.
official, a Greek-Cypriot, and a Turkish Cypriot, has met irregularly since 1984. Turkish Cypriots raise the issue of
an estimated 800 persons missing since
communal violence in 1963-64, and suggest that some Greek Cypriot missing had resulted from fighting between
rightists and communists after the 1974 coup. In
December 1995, the U.N. Committee received files of 1,493 Greek Cypriots and 500 Turkish Cypriots. Clerides said
that 96 missing had been killed in action. On
March 1, 1996, Denktash said that the Turkish Army had captured Greek Cypriots in 1974 and handed them over
to Turkish Cypriot fighters. Revenge "massacres
happened." Asked if that meant that all missing are dead, Denktash responded, "Unfortunately." Clerides insisted
that investigations continue.
P.L. 103-372, October 19, 1994, called on the President to investigate U.S. citizens missing from Cyprus since
1974 and report information on other missing
discovered during investigation to international or nongovernmental organizations. On May 22, 1998, President
Clinton reported to Congress that the remains of
one American had been recovered and identified, and the family informed, and that the other four Americans "in all
likelihood did not survive the events in Cyprus
during the summer of 1974."
In July 1997, Clerides and Denktash agreed to exchange information on the locations of graves of missing
persons and to expedite the return of remains. On
January 23, 1998, their representatives exchanged data. The Greek Cypriots submitted evidence of 200 Turkish
Cypriot missing and the Turkish Cypriots
submitted information on 430 Greek Cypriots, including a map to grave sites. At an April meeting with a U.N.
official, the Turkish Cypriot representative said that
he would not discuss exhumation and return of remains unless the Greek Cypriots agreed to look into the fate of
Greek Cypriot victims of the 1974 coup. The
U.N. finds that this position deviates from the July 1997 agreement. In August 1998, the (Greek) Cypriot
government announced that it would exhume unmarked
graves in the territory it controls and identify remains. From June 1-July 11, 1999, Physicians for Human Rights,
an international non-governmental organization,
exhumed unmarked graves to identify remains genetically. By year's end, the remains of eight Greek Cypriots had
been identified. On June 3,1999, Cypriot
Foreign Minister Kasoulides declared that the missing do not include anyone killed during the 1974 coup.
LEGISLATION
H.Con.Res. 80 (Ros-Lehtinen)/S.Con.Res. 9 (Snowe)
Calls for a U.S. effort to end a list of restrictions on the freedoms and human rights of the enclaved peoples in
the occupied area of Cyprus cited in a 1995 U.N.
Security Council resolution. ("Enclaved peoples" refers to 452 Greek Cypriots who live mostly on the Karpass
peninsula in northeast Cyprus, and 159 Maronite
Christian Cypriots who live in the Kormakiti area of the north. There also are 310 Turkish Cypriots living in the
south.) H.Con.Res. 80 introduced and referred to
Committee on International Relations on March 25, 1999. S.Con.Res. 9 introduced and referred to Committee on
Foreign Relations on February 11, 1999.
H.Con.Res. 100 (Bilirakis)
Commends President Clerides for his decision to cancel deployment of the S-300 missiles; and urges President
Clinton to persuade Turkey to comply with U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1217 and 1218 and to cooperate for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Introduced and
referred to the Committee on International
Relations on May 6, 1999.
H.R. 1211 (Smith)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2000, as amended. H.Rept. 102-122, April 29, 1999, Sec. 702, makes
findings relating to Cyprus and conveys the sense
of Congress that, in light of the action taken by Cyprus in refraining from exercising its right to self-defense by
deploying anti-aircraft missiles, the United States
should do all that is possible to bring about commensurate actions by Turkey and to expect from Turkey compliance
with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1217
and 1218.
H.Res. 361 (Bilirakis)
Urges the President to condition discussions about debt relief or debt refinancing of Turkey's Foreign Military
Financing direct or guaranteed loans, or of the
disbursement of FMF undisbursed loans on resolution of the Cyprus problem. Introduced and referred to the
Committee on International Relations on November
4, 1999.
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